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Abstract
We study the size distribution of power blackouts for the Norwe-
gian and North American power grids. We find that for both systems
the size distribution follows power laws with exponents −1.65 ± 0.05
and −2.0 ± 0.1 respectively. We then present a model with global
redistribution of the load when a link in the system fails which repro-
duces the power law from the Norwegian power grid if the simulation
are carried out on the Norwegian high-voltage power grid. The model
is also applied to regular and irregular networks and give power laws
with exponents −2.0 ± 0.05 for the regular networks and −1.5 ± 0.05
for the irregular networks. A presented mean field theory is in good
agreement with these numerical results.
Large transportation networks like the road system, pipelines and the
electrical power grid are sensitive to local failures. When failures occur the
transport on these networks must be redistributed on the still intact part of
the network, occasionally exceeding the local capacity and causing further
failures[1, 2]. The resulting avalanches may finally end in major breakdowns:
megajams in vehicular traffic or blackouts in the electrical power system.
Such systems get increasingly complex with time as they and the trans-
port on them grow. In addition, the liberalisation of the electrical power
distribution market adds more complexity to the power grid system, since
the market mechanisms give feedback to the production and transport of
power over large regions. As the complexity of these systems increases the
ability to predict the behaviour of large unwanted events becomes more and
more difficult.
Studies of vulnerability and avalanche statistics in complex networks
have been done using different models. In the Motter and Lai model [3]
the load on the network is described by betweenness centrality. Avalanches
generated by this model on scale free networks were found to follow power
law distribution [1]. Alberts et al. studied a similar model on the North
American power grid.[4]
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Transport properties characterised by conductance for different networks
have also been studied on a general basis.[5] And the blackouts in power grids
have also been studied in the context of self-organised criticality[2].
The aim of this Letter is to present a model for such systems using the
network of the electric power grids and to compare the results with observed
data. The electric power distribution system, or power grid, is a system of
generators, transformers, power lines and distribution substations. Earlier
studies of the North American power grid have found the degree distribution
P (k) ∝ e−0.5k with mean degree of 2.67 [4, 6]. We find that the Norwegian
power grid also has an exponential degree distribution, but with a mean
degree of 2.28. The number of nodes in he North American power grid is of
the order of 15000 nodes (generators, substations,...) whereas the Norwegian
one is of the order of 1000 nodes. The difference in mean degree might reflect
the fact that Norway is sparsely populated, and have large regions that are
only supplied by one or two major grid lines, leading to a smaller value of the
mean degree. Power grids are thought to have small world properties, i.e.,
a large degree of clustering and small characteristic length and where the
characteristic path length l scale logarithmically with the number of nodes
[6, 7].
The failure distribution has already been studied for the North American
power grid [8]. The statistics of the failures will depend on which quantity
is used to characterise the size of a failure, either the energy unserved or
the power lost. However, both quantities lead to power laws. We will in
the following compare the model we present in this Letter to the power loss
distribution both for the Norwegian and the North American power grids
[10, 9]. We believe that this is the better of the two quantities to use, as
the energy unserved will depend on human factors like how long it took to
repair a given transmission segment that has broken down.
We present the possibly simplest model which is capable of describing
the above mentioned avalanche effects. Imagine a network consisting of
electrical conductors, all with the same conductance. One node is picked at
random and current will be injected here. Another node, different from the
first, will act as a current drain. A potential difference is set up between
these two nodes and the Kirchhoff equations are solved to find the current in
each link[11]. Once the currents i have been found, we assign a breakdown
threshold t to each link such that t = (1+α)i, where α is a positive number.
The idea here is that each transmission line has been constructed with a
fixed tolerance α. We found that having more current source/sink pair gave
similar results as those found for smaller network, thus effectively reducing
the system size.
We now choose a link and remove it in the same way as is done in
the random fuse model [12, 13, 14]. The currents are then recalculated.
This gives global rearrangement in contrast to the models of self-organised
criticality [15] where load rearrangement is local. Some links will at this
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point carry a current larger than their threshold. These links are then
removed from the network and the currents are recalculated once more.
Again, the bonds where the current exceeds the threshold are removed and
this procedure is repeated until all currents are below the thresholds. This
removal process models an avalanche of failures.
Let the conductance between the source and the sink before the initial
random removal of a link be denoted by Gi and similarly, let Gf be the
conductance after the avalanche is finished. The difference ∆G = Gi − Gf
is a measure of the magnitude of the avalanche generated by that removal.
If the voltage V between the source and sink nodes is kept fixed during the
blackout event, the change in conductance ∆G will be proportional to the
power loss: ∆P = Pi−Pf = V
2∆G. For normalisation purposes, we will in
the following define ∆G = (Gi −Gf )/Gi.
The results we present here are based on generating ensembles of net-
works and for each network systematically choosing every link as initiator of
a blackout event. We study two classes of networks: Random networks with
exponential degree distribution, P (k) ∝ e−0.5k which is the same as for the
Norwegian and North American networks, and small world networks [16]
with mean degree 2.67. Both these network classes have a mean shortest
distance l that scale logarithmically with the system size.
We also study square and triangular lattices with bi-periodic boundary
conditions, where l grows as the square root of the number of nodes. In
addition to these networks and lattices we implement the model on networks
with the topology from the Norwegian and North American power grid.
We did simulations for network sizes up to 5041 nodes for the four dif-
ferent artificial network types described above, using the conjugate gradi-
ent algorithm to solve the Kirchhoff equations on the network using an
error-criterion of 10−16 [11]. We find that the random and the small world
networks give power law probability distributions for the conductance loss
p(∆G) ∼ ∆G−γ , as does simulations on the network based on the Norwe-
gian power grid. The regular lattices also give rise to power laws, but with
a different value for γ. It is worth noting that in a study of a somewhat
related model by Roux et al. [17], power laws were observed. In that model,
a square lattice between two parallel bus bars are gradually depleted by
the randomly removing link by link and recording in a histogram the con-
ductance changes between each removal. The scaling of the conductance
changes could be traced back to the increasing connectivity length during
the process. In this depletion process the thresholds are uncorrelated with
the initial currents, while in our case the threshold and initial current dis-
tributions are identical.
We show in fig. 1 the probability density of conductance changes ∆G for
the random exponential, the small world networks and for the two regular
networks. We find that the conductance changes follow power laws in two
different regimes. There is a small-event regime characterised by p(∆G) ∼
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Figure 1: Probability density function of conductance losses for different net-
work and lattice types. The data for the regular lattices have been moved
two orders of magnitude towards the right to separate them from the irreg-
ular networks. (Exp = exponential network, SW = small world network,
Sq = square lattice, Tri = triangular lattice). Some data points for the
irregular network have ∆G > 1 since the data is put at the midpoints of the
logarithmic bins.
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Figure 2: Our model implemented on the Norwegian (1220 nodes) and North
American Power (4941 nodes) grids. The straight lines correspond to the
power laws observed in the data of fig. 5(b).
∆G−0.5. The exponent −0.5 seems to be independent of network or lattice
type. The large-event regime is characterised by two different power laws.
The irregular networks follow a power law characterised by an exponent
−1.5 ± 0.05, whereas the regular lattices follow a power law characterised
by an exponent −2.0± 0.07.
The simulations were performed with α = 3.0. For smaller values of α a
large number of the breakdowns broke the system completely with ∆G = 1.0,
thus destroying the power law tail for large ∆Gs. Larger values of α did
not change the tail of the distribution. For the real power blackout data the
largest events that were recorded removed 5% of the totalt capacity of the
system. This fact supports the use of an α that does not break the system
completely i. e. ∆G < 1.
For both the random and the small-world networks, we find that the
initial current distribution follows a power law, hence giving a power law
distribution of the thresholds.
We now present a mean field estimate of the current distribution in
an infinite network. Assume that n(r) is the average number of links at
a distance r from an arbitrarily chosen origin. r is the graph theoretical
distance, which is of the same order of magnitude as the Euclidean one
for a lattice. If a current is injected into the network at the origin, the
typical current i(r) in a link at a distance r from the origin will be inversely
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Figure 3: The average number of neighbours n(r) at a distance r for the
exponential and the small world networks. n(r) falls of for large r due to
the finite size of the networks.
proportional to the average number of links at that distance, i(r) ∝ 1/n(r).
Since n(r) is a monotonically increasing function of r, i(r) is a monotonically
decreasing function of r: The smaller the r, the larger the average current
i(r). The number of links carrying a current higher than a given value i,
i.e., the cumulative current distribution P (i), is then simply given by
P (i) ∼
∫ r(i)
0
n(r′)dr′, (1)
where we have defined r(i) as the solution with respect to r of the equation
i = 1/n(r).
For the random exponential networks and the small world networks we
have that n(r) ∼ eβr for small r. This is shown numerically in fig. 3. Hence,
combining this behaviour with eq. (1), we find
P (i) ∼
∫
−(1/k) ln(i)
0
eβr
′
dr′ ∼
1
i
, (2)
for large i. This is the behaviour we see in fig. 4.
We note here, as support for the mean field argument we have just
presented, that for square and triangular networks, where n(r) ∼ 1/r, the
mean field argument gives P (i) ∼ i−2, which we also verified numerically.
Assume that the resistance ∆R when a link is broken is much less than
the total resistance R. With constant voltage difference between the sink
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Figure 4: Cumulative current distribution for random exponential and small
scale networks each containing 5041 nodes. The distribution function is
P (i) ∼ i−1, as excepted from eq. (2). The inset shows ∆G vs. i. for
α = 3.0. The solid line in the inset is i2.
and source ∆R is proportional to ∆G to the first order of ∆G
∆R ∼
∆G
G2
, (3)
where G is the conductance for the whole system.
Assuming an intermediate length l, larger than the lattice constant, but
smaller than the system size, Roux et al. [17] argued using Tellegen’s theorem
from network theory in electrical engineering [18] that
∆R = ∆Rl
(
il
I
)2
(4)
where ∆Rl is the resistance change at scale l, il is the current of a region of
scale l and I is the total current. Combining eq. (3) and eq. (4) one gets
∆Gj ∼ i
2
j (5)
which describes the relation between the conductance loss to the system
when bond j is removed and ij is the current through the bond. We show
the correlation between conductance change ∆Gj and the current ij during
the breakdown process for our model in the inset of fig. 4.
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With the cumulative current probability shown in fig. 4 and using eqs.
(2) and (5) we would expect a distribution function p(∆G) ∼ ∆G−1.5 for the
exponential and small world networks, which is indeed what was observed
in fig. 1. We also find that the above argument also predicts the correct
distribution function for the regular networks in fig. 1, p(∆G) ∼ ∆G−2.0.
We note that this argument is based on each breakdown event only
involving a single bond. If there is a typical or dominating current carried
by the bonds in the avalanches involving more than one bond — and a
corresponding conductance change, the argument we have presented carries
over to this situation.
The power law for small events, p(∆G) ∼ ∆G−0.5 in fig. 1 corresponds to
a uniform distribution function for the corresponding currents, when using
eq. (5).
Finally, we compare the results from our simulations with blackout data
from the Norwegian main power grid and data from the largest blackouts in
the North American power grid [9, 10]. These data are different due to the
fact that the North American data set only look at large events ∆P > 10
MW, while the Norwegian data set is for ∆P > 0.1 MW.
The power blackout data from the main Norwegian central power grid
was collected for the period 1995-2005. The North American data span the
period 1984-2002. In fig. 5(a), we show the cumulative probability P (∆P )
giving the probability to find an event larger than or equal to ∆P . This
function is extracted from the data by ordering them in a ascending sequence
and then plotting event k in the sequence along the abscissa together with
k/(N + 1) along the ordinate, where N is the total number of events [19].
In fig. 5(b), we have shifted the data North American data from fig.
5(a) to simplify the comparison of the data. The cumulative probability
has furthermore been multiplied by ∆P 0.65. The ensuing flat plateau in the
Norwegian 1995–2005 data suggests that the probability density follows a
power law of the form p(∆P ) ∼ ∆P−1.65. For large values of ∆P it falls
off faster. The North American data do not show such a plateau. However,
they are consistent with a law regime corresponding to p(∆P ) ∼ ∆P−1.9.
The inset shows P (∆P )∆P 1.05 which indicates a power law of the form
p(∆P ) ∼ ∆P−2.05 for the North American data supporting a exponent −2
for this blackout distribution without a cut-off for large ∆P s.
We show in fig. 2 an implementation of our model on the Norwegian
and North American power grids[20]. We have fitted power laws to the
distribution with exponents −1.65 and −1.9. These are the power laws that
were observed in the blackout histograms shown in fig. 5(b). We see that
the model produces data that are consistent with the observations for the
Norwegian power grid, while the data for the North American power grid
is inconclusive. It is furthermore interesting to observe that the exponents
occurring in the data for moderately sized blackouts lie in between the results
of the model implemented on the irregular networks (exponent -1.5) and the
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Figure 5: a) Cumulative distribution P (∆P ) for blackout events ∆P in the
Norwegian (373 events) and North American (390 events) power grids. b)
P (∆P )∆P 0.65 for blackout events ∆P in the Norwegian and North American
power grids. The straight line to the left following the North American data
has an exponent of −0.24.
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regular lattices (exponent -2). The model does not reproduce the large scale
blackout distributions for the Norwegian power grid which fall of faster than
∆P−1.65. We also see a small scale regime as for the artificial networks in fig.
1. Hence, the simple model we have introduced is capable to reproduce some
aspects of the observed blackout distribution quantitatively with reasonable
precision.
The difference for large ∆P s in the Norwegian and the North American
datasets could be accounted for by the fact that the North American data
also includes large events like snowstorms, hurricanes, while the Norwegian
data do not include these events. The difference in nature of widespread
events like a hurricane compared with a power line fault can be the cause
of the cut off in the Norwegian dataset. This could also be the reason why
the exponent for the Norwegian power grid is close to the theoretical value
for irregular networks since this argument is based on breaking single links.
The reason why there is a difference in the conductance loss distributions
for the simulation with the Norwegian and the North American power grid
is not clear. There are however some differences between these two networks
when we look at more than just the degree distribution. We observed two
differences in n(r) for these to power grids. First n(r) for the Norwegian
network is closer to an exponential than the North American network for
small r values, and there is a more pronounced peak in n(r) for the Nor-
wegian network, while the North American network have relatively wide
plateu. This could explain the difference in p(∆G) found in the simulations
done on these networks.
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